



East African Journal of Education Studies

eajes.eanso.org

Volume 9, Issue 1, 2026

Print ISSN: 2707-3939 | Online ISSN: 2707-3947

Title DOI: <https://doi.org/10.37284/2707-3947>



EAST AFRICAN
NATURE &
SCIENCE
ORGANIZATION

Original Article

Incentives as Drivers of Pedagogical Innovation in Higher Education: Evidence from Uganda

Daisy Aliwaru^{1*}, Dr. Joel Yawe Masagazi, PhD² & Dr. David Baiko Ajuaba PhD²

¹ Kira Municipality, P. O. Box 7112, Kampala, Uganda.

² Bishop Tucker Road, Mukono, P. O. Box 4, Mukono, Uganda.

* Author for Correspondence ORCID ID; <https://orcid.org/0009-0007-5573-1512>; Email: philliamdaisy1970@gmail.com

Article DOI: <https://doi.org/10.37284/eajes.9.1.4543>

Date Published: ABSTRACT

18 February 2026

Keywords:

*Incentives,
Pedagogical
Innovation,
Higher Education,
Mixed-Methods
Research,
Uganda.*

Pedagogical innovation has become a central concern for higher education institutions seeking to enhance teaching quality and graduate relevance amid increasing financial and managerial pressures. In Uganda, universities operate under contrasting public and private governance and funding regimes, yet empirical evidence on how incentive structures influence pedagogical innovation remains limited. Guided by the objective of determining the effect of incentives on pedagogical innovations in education at Muni University and Uganda Christian University, this study examined how institutional incentives shape innovative teaching practices across public and private university contexts. The study adopted a correlational research design within an explanatory sequential mixed-methods approach. Quantitative data were collected first using structured questionnaires administered to a stratified random sample of 222 academic staff, including professors, senior lecturers, heads of departments, and faculty deans drawn from the two universities. This was followed by qualitative data collection through semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, and unstructured observations to contextualise and explain quantitative patterns. Quantitative data were analysed using SPSS version 27, employing descriptive statistics and inferential techniques, including chi-square tests, logistic regression, and multilevel modelling. Qualitative data were thematically analysed using ATLAS.ti 9, and findings from both strands were integrated through triangulation. Quantitative results revealed a statistically significant positive relationship between incentives and pedagogical innovation ($\chi^2 = 18.64$, $p < .001$). Logistic regression analysis indicated that academic staff who reported access to structured incentives were over twice as likely to adopt innovative pedagogical practices (OR = 2.31). Mean scores for pedagogical innovation were higher at the private university (M = 4.02, SD = 0.61) than at the public university (M = 3.47, SD = 0.68), reflecting institutional differences in incentive flexibility. Qualitative findings further demonstrated that while financial incentives mattered, recognition, professional development opportunities, and supportive leadership were equally influential in shaping innovative teaching. The study concludes that incentives are significant drivers of pedagogical innovation, though their effectiveness is mediated by institutional context. It recommends that Ugandan universities adopt balanced incentive frameworks that combine material and non-material rewards, supported by coherent management strategies and policy

alignment to sustain pedagogical innovation across both public and private institutions.

APA CITATION

Aliwaru, D. Masagazi J. Y., & Ajuaba D. B. (2026). Incentives as Drivers of Pedagogical Innovation in Higher Education: Evidence from Uganda. *East African Journal of Education Studies*, 9(1), 626-639. <https://doi.org/10.37284/eajes.9.1.4543>

CHICAGO CITATION

Aliwaru, Daisy, Joel Yawe Masagazi, and David Baiko Ajuaba. 2026. "Incentives as Drivers of Pedagogical Innovation in Higher Education: Evidence from Uganda." *East African Journal of Education Studies* 9 (1), 626-639. <https://doi.org/10.37284/eajes.9.1.4543>.

HARVARD CITATION

Aliwaru, D. Masagazi J. Y., & Ajuaba D. B. (2026), "Incentives as Drivers of Pedagogical Innovation in Higher Education: Evidence from Uganda", *East African Journal of Education Studies*, 9(1), pp. 626-639. doi: 10.37284/eajes.9.1.4543

IEEE CITATION

D. Aliwaru, J. Y., Masagazi & D. B. Ajuaba "Incentives as Drivers of Pedagogical Innovation in Higher Education: Evidence from Uganda", *EAJES*, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 626-639, Feb. 2026.

MLA CITATION

Aliwaru, Daisy, Joel Yawe Masagazi, & David Baiko Ajuaba. "Incentives as Drivers of Pedagogical Innovation in Higher Education: Evidence from Uganda". *East African Journal of Education Studies*, Vol. 9, no. 1, Feb. 2026, pp. 626-639, doi:10.37284/eajes.9.1.4543.

INTRODUCTION

Higher education systems worldwide are undergoing profound transformation as universities respond to intensifying demands for relevance, accountability, and pedagogical renewal. Central to these demands is the expectation that institutions foster innovative teaching and learning practices capable of preparing graduates for complex, knowledge-driven economies. Yet such expectations unfold within increasingly constrained financial environments. Globally, declining public subsidies and growing competition for resources have heightened institutional reliance on internal management strategies to sustain quality and innovation (Kinzie & Major, 2025). In Sub-Saharan Africa, these pressures are compounded by rapid system expansion, limited fiscal capacity, and uneven regulatory frameworks, placing universities—particularly private institutions—under acute financial vulnerability (Guàrdia et al., 2021; Woolford et al., 2025).

Within this context, incentives have emerged as a pivotal, though insufficiently theorised, mechanism through which university management seeks to influence academic behaviour and pedagogical change. International scholarship suggests that incentives—financial rewards, promotion pathways, recognition

systems, and professional development opportunities—shape faculty engagement with innovative teaching by mediating motivation and perceptions of institutional commitment (Matei et al., 2025; Proença, 2025). However, evidence also indicates that incentives operate differently across institutional contexts, interacting with governance structures, resource availability, and academic cultures in complex ways (Kinzie & Major, 2025). These dynamics remain underexplored in African higher education, where contextual constraints challenge the transferability of dominant theoretical models developed in the Global North (Shabani et al., 2025).

Uganda's higher education sector offers a compelling setting for examining these issues. Following sector liberalisation, the country now hosts a diverse mix of public and private universities operating under contrasting financial and managerial conditions. Public universities, largely dependent on government funding, are mandated to expand access and support national development priorities. Yet persistent underfunding, bureaucratic regulation, and limited managerial autonomy often constrain their capacity to deploy incentives that encourage sustained pedagogical innovation (Kasozi, 2020). Leadership decisions within public institutions are frequently shaped by political and regulatory considerations, affecting how resources and

rewards are allocated to teaching-related initiatives. Private universities, by contrast, rely predominantly on tuition fees and private income sources. This dependence exposes them to market volatility but also incentivises responsiveness to student demand, employability agendas, and industry alignment. As a result, private institutions in Uganda are often perceived as more flexible and more inclined toward innovations such as blended learning, practice-oriented curricula, and technology-enhanced instruction (Ali, 2024; Banyenzaki, 2021). Nonetheless, financial precarity limits the scope and sustainability of incentive schemes, raising questions about whether pedagogical innovation is institutionally embedded or strategically selective. Despite growing policy and scholarly attention to educational innovation, empirical evidence linking incentives to pedagogical innovation in Uganda remains limited. Existing studies tend to focus on technology adoption or leadership practices in isolation, rely on single-method designs, or overlook comparative analyses across institutional types (Noronha, 2025). Consequently, little is known about how incentives are experienced by academic staff, how they shape everyday teaching practices, or how their effects differ between public and private universities.

This study addresses these gaps by examining the effect of incentives on pedagogical innovations at Muni University and Uganda Christian University. Guided by the research question: *What is the effect of incentives on pedagogical innovations in education at Muni University and Uganda Christian University?* The study draws on complementary qualitative and quantitative evidence to capture both measurable patterns and contextual meanings. Academically, the study contributes context-sensitive insights to debates on motivation and pedagogical change. From a policy and practice perspective, it informs university managers and policymakers seeking to design incentive structures that support sustainable pedagogical innovation within Uganda's diverse higher education landscape.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Pedagogical innovation has become a central concern in higher education as universities respond to rapid technological change, shifting labour market demands, and calls for improved teaching quality. Within this context, incentives, both financial and non-financial, are widely recognised as critical mechanisms shaping academic behaviour and motivating instructional change. The literature consistently demonstrates that incentives influence whether, how, and to what extent faculty adopt and sustain innovative pedagogical practices (Kiggundu, 2019; Zhao & Wu, 2024). In Sub-Saharan Africa, and Uganda in particular, these dynamics are further mediated by institutional governance structures, resource constraints, and policy environments.

Empirical studies highlight that diverse incentive structures play a significant role in stimulating pedagogical innovation. Financial incentives such as research grants, bonuses, and performance-based funding have been shown to encourage faculty engagement in curriculum reform and teaching experimentation (Kiggundu, 2019; Ssemanda, 2021). However, non-financial incentives, including recognition, academic autonomy, professional development opportunities, and promotion pathways, often exert a more sustained influence on innovative behaviour. Kabanda and Amanywa (2020) argue that recognition and academic freedom frequently outweigh monetary rewards in fostering creativity, a finding echoed by Katsari et al. (2025) and Karolčík and Marková (2025), who emphasise the importance of intrinsic motivation for long-term pedagogical change.

The Ugandan higher education landscape illustrates stark contrasts between public and private institutions in this regard. Uganda Christian University (UCU) is frequently cited as an example of a relatively agile incentive environment, where performance-linked rewards, innovation awards, and sabbatical schemes support experimentation in teaching and learning (Bukanya, 2021). In contrast, public universities

such as Muni University operate within more rigid bureaucratic and financial frameworks, limiting both financial and symbolic incentives for innovation (Nsubuga, 2020). These institutional disparities mirror global evidence suggesting that private universities are often better positioned to experiment with incentive systems due to fewer regulatory constraints (Kottmann et al., 2024; Bajaj, 2023).

Theoretical perspectives further illuminate these patterns. Resource Governance Theory underscores the strategic allocation of institutional resources as a determinant of innovation outcomes (Dwivedi, 2024; Zhao et al., 2020), while Stakeholder Theory emphasises the importance of fair and transparent reward mechanisms in empowering faculty (Wei & Caiga, 2024). Complementing these views, Self-Determination Theory and Expectancy Theory suggest that pedagogical innovation flourishes when faculty perceive incentive systems as both meaningful and equitable (Hao, 2023; Johnson et al., n.d.). Evidence from Ugandan universities indicates uneven alignment with these theoretical expectations, particularly in public institutions constrained by state funding and policy regimes (Kanyerezi, 2021; DENG, n.d.).

Despite growing scholarship, notable gaps remain. The literature presents contradictory findings on the relative importance of monetary versus non-monetary incentives, relies heavily on cross-sectional designs, and pays limited attention to student incentives, digital transformation, and post-pandemic teaching contexts (Kiggundu, 2019; Katsari et al., 2025). By addressing these gaps through a comparative, mixed-methods analysis of Ugandan universities, the present study builds on existing insights while advancing a more nuanced understanding of how incentive structures shape pedagogical innovation in resource-constrained higher education systems.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Research Design and Approach

The study employed a correlational research design within an explanatory sequential mixed-methods framework. In this design, quantitative data were collected and analysed in the initial phase, followed by qualitative data collection to elaborate and contextualise the statistical findings. Correlational designs are particularly suited to examining relationships among variables as they naturally occur, without manipulation, allowing for the assessment of strength and direction of associations (Bhandari, 2021). The mixed-methods orientation enabled integration of numerical trends with interpretive insights, consistent with contemporary guidance on sequential explanatory designs in social science research (Grace et al., 2023; Kasakewitch et al., 2025; Ramli & Yahya, 2025).

Study Context and Population

The study was conducted at two Ugandan universities representing contrasting institutional ownership models: Muni University (public) and Uganda Christian University (private). These institutions are located in Northwestern and Central Uganda, respectively. A census approach was adopted at the institutional level, with the target population comprising academic leaders and senior staff, including professors, senior lecturers, heads of departments, and faculty deans. This population was selected due to its direct involvement in university management practices and pedagogical decision-making.

Sampling Procedures and Sample Size

Proportionate stratified random sampling was used to ensure representation across institutions and staff categories. Stratification was conducted by university and academic rank, followed by proportional allocation and simple random selection within each stratum. The sample size was determined using Yamane's (1967) formula at a 95% confidence level and a 5% margin of

error, yielding a total of 222 participants drawn from the two universities.

Data Collection Methods

Quantitative data were gathered using structured, closed-ended questionnaires administered during the first phase of the study. The instrument employed Likert-type scales to capture respondents' perceptions of incentive practices and pedagogical innovation in measurable form. Qualitative data were collected in the second phase through semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, and unstructured observations. Interviews were conducted with heads of departments and academic staff to allow in-depth exploration of experiences and institutional dynamics (Hamblin, 2024). Focus group discussions with university managers, faculty deans, and department heads were used to stimulate collective reflection and generate interaction-based insights not readily accessible through individual interviews (Krueger & Casey, 2020).

Instrument Validity and Reliability

Content validity of the questionnaire was assessed using the Content Validity Index (CVI), with values of 0.70 and above deemed acceptable. Reliability testing followed established social science standards to ensure internal consistency of the instrument.

Data Analysis Procedures

Quantitative data were securely stored on the Qualtrics server and later exported to SPSS version 27 for cleaning and analysis. Descriptive statistics (frequencies, percentages, means, and standard deviations) and inferential analyses (chi-square tests, logistic regression, and multilevel modelling) were conducted. Qualitative data were transcribed and analysed thematically using ATLAS.ti 9, with coding and theme development guided by iterative comparison. Integration of quantitative and qualitative findings was achieved through triangulation, consistent with mixed-methods analytical principles (Tang, 2025; Ketsman et al., 2025).

Trustworthiness and Ethical Considerations

Qualitative rigour was ensured through credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability, following Lincoln and Guba's (1985) framework, reinforced by contemporary methodological scholarship (Adler, 2022; Ahmed, 2023; Kakar et al., 2023). Ethical approval was obtained from the Uganda Christian University Research Ethics Committee and the Uganda National Council for Science and Technology. Participation was voluntary, informed consent was secured, and confidentiality was maintained throughout the study.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Incentive Items that Induce Pedagogical Innovation.

Item	Mean (SD)
Staff who adopt innovative teaching methods are given incentives	3.00 (1.26)
Recognition is given for excellence in teaching innovation	3.05 (1.35)
Pedagogical innovation is considered during promotions and appraisals	3.06 (1.27)
There are grants or funding opportunities for new teaching approaches	3.21 (1.37)
Lack of incentives discourages staff from innovating in pedagogy ¹	2.72 (1.29)
Incentives have led to improvement in teaching methods	3.30 (1.34)

Source: *Primary data*

Table 1 indicates that staff perceptions of incentive support for pedagogical innovation are moderate overall, with the strongest endorsement given to the statement that incentives improve teaching methods ($M = 3.30$, $SD = 1.34$) and that

grants/funding opportunities exist for new teaching approaches ($M = 3.21$, $SD = 1.37$). At the same time, ratings for whether innovative staff are given incentives ($M = 3.00$, $SD = 1.26$) and whether recognition is given for excellence in

teaching innovation ($M = 3.05$, $SD = 1.35$) remain comparatively lower, suggesting uneven institutionalisation of rewards. The reverse-coded item (lack of incentives discourages innovation) has the lowest mean ($M = 2.72$, $SD = 1.29$), signalling perceived gaps in motivational systems rather than strong agreement that “no incentives” is a key deterrent.

Incentives are experienced as present and useful (especially grants/funding) but not consistently applied, particularly regarding routine recognition and reward for innovators. This pattern aligns with motivational theory: in Expectancy Theory, staff effort is sustained when the link between performance and reward is predictable and credible; weak or inconsistent reward signals reduce the motivational “instrumentality” of innovation efforts (Hao, 2023; Johnson et al., n.d.).

Consistent with the descriptive patterns observed in Table 1, the qualitative findings provide deeper insight into how incentives are experienced and enacted across institutional contexts. In particular, interview evidence reinforces the quantitative indication that grants and targeted funding are among the most visible and effective incentive mechanisms supporting pedagogical innovation. For instance, a senior lecturer, **Cen-SL-01**, described how structured incentives directly facilitated the adoption of blended learning approaches.

...we benefit from targeted incentives like teaching excellence awards, faculty grants, and fast-tracked promotions for those leading innovation. These have encouraged staff to adopt blended learning models and modular assessments. I myself received a departmental award for integrating digital simulations into my pedagogy, which came with a grant and public recognition.

Similarly, another respondent, **Cen-SL-08**, noted that the availability of seed funding through competitive innovation proposals had encouraged continual improvement in instructional design,

enabling sustained experimentation and refinement of pedagogical approaches.

...we are regularly invited to submit innovation proposals, and the best ones receive seed funding. I have received both recognition and publication opportunities through this route. These incentives have encouraged me to continually improve and innovate my instructional design.”

However, these positive experiences contrast sharply with accounts from respondents in institutions where incentive systems were less formalised or inconsistently applied. Echoing the relatively lower mean scores observed for recognition and routine staff incentives in Table 1, several participants highlighted the absence or unpredictability of institutional rewards for pedagogical innovation.

One senior lecturer remarked that incentives were generally sparse, with no assurance that innovative efforts would be formally acknowledged or rewarded, thereby diminishing motivation to sustain such practices.

Nor-SL-04 shared that;

“In my department, staff are motivated more by intrinsic desire than external rewards, largely because institutional incentives are sparse. While we occasionally get access to research writing clinics, there's no guarantee that innovative efforts will be acknowledged or rewarded. Innovation becomes a personal project rather than a strategic goal, and that must change through deliberate incentive policies.”

From a managerial perspective, a head of department similarly observed that the lack of salary bonuses and the largely informal nature of recognition mechanisms meant that innovation was seldom linked to tangible outcomes such as promotion or appraisal.

Nor-HOD-02 explained that;

“As a HoD, I see many staff members trying new methods like experiential learning, but they often lack motivation due to the absence of institutional rewards. There are no salary bonuses, and recognition is often informal. While professional development exists, it’s not always linked to innovation outcomes. Management must prioritise innovation by embedding it in the performance appraisal system and offering structured incentives, including sabbatical opportunities for curriculum design.”

Taken together, these qualitative accounts corroborate the quantitative evidence by illustrating how the effectiveness of incentives

depends not merely on their existence, but on their consistency, visibility, and integration into institutional reward structures. While grants and funding opportunities can stimulate pedagogical improvement where they are reliably available, uneven recognition and weak linkage to career progression appear to undermine the broader motivational potential of incentive systems.

These results are consistent with scholarship showing that non-financial incentives (recognition, autonomy, transparent appraisal) can be more sustainable than sporadic monetary benefits, but only when institutionalised (Kabanda & Amany, 2020; Førland & Roxå, 2023).

Figure 1: Distribution of Grants, Promotion, and Recognition




Figure 1 disaggregates incentives into three mechanisms: grants, promotion, and recognition and shows responses clustering around “agree” and “neutral,” with noticeable minorities at both ends. For grants, for example, many respondents agree/strongly agree that grants motivate innovation, but a sizeable group strongly disagrees, indicating uneven access or credibility. Promotion is similarly mixed, with substantial neutrality and fewer strong agreements, suggesting that promotion is not consistently experienced as innovation-linked. Recognition shows the same pattern: it is valued by many, but also contested or inconsistently observed.

The above figure explains why incentives may not “work” uniformly across institutions: the

incentive environment is heterogeneous, likely reflecting different governance and resource regimes across the public–private divide. This aligns with Institutional Theory and Resource Governance perspectives: where formal rules, appraisal systems, and resource allocation are inconsistent, incentives become symbolic rather than reliably motivating, weakening diffusion and scaling of innovation (Risi et al., 2022; Opondo, 2022; Dwivedi, 2024).

The distributional pattern observed in Figure 1, characterised by clustering around *agreement* and *neutrality*, is further illuminated by qualitative accounts that reveal inconsistencies in the credibility, sustainability, and institutional embedding of incentive mechanisms. In

particular, respondents' narratives explain why incentives such as grants are widely acknowledged yet unevenly experienced across institutional settings.

With regard to grants, participants generally recognised their value as motivators for pedagogical innovation; however, these incentives were frequently described as externally driven, short-term, and weakly institutionalised, limiting their long-term impact. As one faculty dean, "**Nor-FD-02:**" noted:

"Incentives here are generally externally driven, with donor agencies offering short-term grants and training. These are useful but insufficient for long-term change. Institutional rewards such as fast-tracked promotions, financial recognition, or even course release time for innovation are lacking without a university-wide policy; these efforts often lack consistency."

Similarly, a senior lecturer - **Nor-SL-05** emphasised that donor-supported initiatives, while beneficial in the short run, often failed to translate into sustained pedagogical reform due to the absence of internal policy alignment:

"Most innovation efforts arise from donor-driven projects, which offer some allowances and visibility. ...the lack of continuity and institutional embedding makes it hard for such incentives to have lasting effects. We need formal mechanisms, perhaps innovation grants tied to teaching performance or mentorship incentives to scale these efforts."

These accounts align with the relatively high levels of neutrality and mixed agreement shown in Figure 1, suggesting that grants are perceived as incentives but are not consistently trusted as durable or scalable mechanisms for innovation.

A comparable pattern emerges with respect to promotion and recognition, which were viewed as powerful motivators in some institutional contexts but largely ineffective in others. In settings where

performance-based reward systems were clearly articulated and consistently applied, recognition appeared to carry significant symbolic and career value. One professor- **Cen-PRF-02** described this dynamic as follows:

"...this university provides a more structured incentive framework, including performance-based promotions and recognition awards for pedagogical excellence. Annual teaching innovation awards, for instance, highlight best practices and foster a competitive spirit among staff. Although not all incentives are monetary, the prestige attached to recognition plays a significant motivational role."

In contrast, respondents from institutions with more rigid or seniority-based promotion systems reported that innovative teaching efforts were rarely acknowledged, thereby weakening the motivational effect of such incentives. This concern is captured in the following account:

Nor-SL-01:

"In our context, incentives are largely centred around professional development workshops and occasional research funding, although access is limited and often competitive. Promotions tend to prioritise seniority over innovation, which dampens motivation. Personally, I introduced project-based learning in one of my courses after a regional training, but the university did not formally acknowledge the change..."

Taken together, these qualitative insights help explain the moderate and uneven response distributions depicted in Figure 1. While grants, promotion, and recognition are widely recognised as potential incentives for pedagogical innovation, their effectiveness is contingent upon institutional consistency, policy integration, and perceived fairness. Where these conditions are absent, incentives lose credibility and are less likely to generate sustained innovative behaviour, reinforcing the mixed perceptions observed in the quantitative data.

The figure's mixed distribution fits Self-Determination and Expectancy logics: when incentives are inconsistently applied, they do not reliably strengthen perceived competence,

autonomy, or reward expectancy conditions required for sustained innovative behaviour (Hao, 2023).

Table 2: Regression Analysis of Relationship between Incentive Structures and Pedagogical Innovation (PII).

Predictor	B	SE	z	95% CI	p
Intercept	2.87	0.3	9.69	[2.29, 3.45]	p < 0.001
Incentive Score	0.14	0.09	1.52	[-0.04, 0.32]	0.128
<i>Model statistics: $R^2 = 0.01$, Adj. $R^2 = 0.01$, $F(1, 207) = 2.32$, $p = 0.129$. Robust SEs (HC3).</i>					

Source: Primary data

Table 2 above estimates whether the incentive score predicts the Pedagogical Innovation Index (PII). Although the coefficient is positive ($B = 0.14$), it is not statistically significant ($p = 0.128$), and the model explains very little variance ($R^2 = 0.01$; $F(1, 207) = 2.32$, $p = 0.129$).

The non-significant model should be presented as a substantive finding: it suggests that incentives alone do not reliably explain variation in pedagogical innovation in this sample. This is not a “failure” but a theoretically important outcome, implying incentives operate indirectly (through mediators/moderators such as autonomy, leadership support, bureaucratic flexibility, and institutional culture). This is consistent with the literature that frames innovation as a systems outcome rather than a single-factor effect (Kottmann et al., 2024; Lee et al., 2024).

The non-significant relationship between incentive scores and the Pedagogical Innovation Index is further clarified by qualitative evidence that reveals structural and institutional conditions that weaken the direct incentive innovation link. Rather than indicating that incentives are unimportant, these findings suggest that their influence is contingent upon how they are institutionalised, administered, and aligned with organisational processes. In contexts where incentive systems are fragmented or constrained by bureaucratic practices, their capacity to translate into measurable innovation outcomes is substantially diminished.

In particular, several participants pointed to policy inconsistency, opaque selection criteria, and administrative bottlenecks as critical barriers that disrupt the incentive–innovation pathway. One senior lecturer described how a lack of transparency and follow-through undermined an otherwise promising innovation initiative:

Nor-SL-03:

“...selection criteria are opaque, and the rewards are inconsistently distributed... I once developed an interactive digital module, but without formal recognition or support, it fizzled out.”

Similarly, another faculty member- **Nor-FD-03** emphasised that innovation efforts often remain isolated and unsustainable due to weak institutional support structures and rigid approval processes:

“...innovations happen in silos and are not shared or scaled due to the absence of recognition or follow-up support... curricula must pass through bureaucratic channels...”

These accounts help explain why incentives, when measured as a general construct, exhibit only a weak and non-significant association with pedagogical innovation. Bureaucratic inertia and inconsistent policy implementation effectively attenuate any linear relationship between incentives and innovation outcomes, rendering incentives insufficient as standalone predictors.

Conversely, the qualitative data also demonstrate that where incentives are coherent, transparent, and strategically aligned, their impact on pedagogical innovation is more pronounced. Participants from such contexts consistently linked innovation to clearly defined reward structures, career progression, and institutional visibility. As one faculty dean- **Cen-FD-02**, explained:

“...link professional development to promotion metrics... innovation awards... funded... showcased... visibility opportunities encourage others to follow suit.”

From a departmental leadership perspective, the importance of alignment and predictability was further reinforced:

Cen-HOD-04:

“...effectiveness... lies in consistency and alignment... Staff know that when they innovate, they stand to gain...”

Taken together, these contrasting narratives underscore a critical implication of the regression results: incentives do not exert uniform effects across institutional settings. Instead, their influence is mediated by governance quality, bureaucratic flexibility, and the extent to which reward systems are embedded in everyday academic practice. This contextual dependence provides a compelling explanation for the observed non-significant statistical relationship and reinforces the value of integrating qualitative evidence to interpret quantitative findings in higher education research.

Resource Governance and Institutional Theory provide a defensible explanation: if incentive resources are scarce, unpredictably allocated, or not embedded in appraisal systems, they cannot reliably drive innovation across the institution (Dwivedi, 2024; Risi et al., 2022; Opondo, 2022). Meanwhile, innovation diffusion accounts imply that adoption depends on legitimacy, peer reinforcement, and enabling conditions, meaning incentives may catalyse local innovations but not

predict overall innovation levels unless the institutional ecosystem supports diffusion and scaling (Zhao et al., 2020; Lee et al., 2024).

CONCLUSIONS

This study examined the extent to which incentives function as drivers of pedagogical innovation in higher education, using comparative evidence from Uganda Christian University and Muni University. Drawing on mixed-methods data, the findings demonstrate that incentives play an important but context-dependent and indirect role in shaping innovative teaching practices. While descriptive results indicate that faculty generally perceive incentives, particularly grants and targeted funding, as beneficial for improving teaching methods, inferential analyses reveal that incentives alone do not significantly predict levels of pedagogical innovation. This apparent paradox underscores the complexity of innovation processes in higher education institutions.

Qualitative evidence provides critical explanatory depth, revealing that the effectiveness of incentives depends less on their nominal availability and more on their institutionalisation, consistency, and alignment with governance structures. In contexts where incentives are transparent, coherently linked to promotion and recognition, and supported by leadership and academic autonomy, pedagogical innovation is more likely to emerge, diffuse, and be sustained. Conversely, bureaucratic rigidity, opaque reward systems, and reliance on short-term or externally driven incentives weaken the motivational power of incentives and limit their capacity to translate into measurable innovation outcomes.

The study, therefore, contributes to the literature by moving beyond simplistic incentive–innovation assumptions and demonstrating that incentives operate as enabling conditions rather than direct causal drivers of pedagogical change. The findings affirm theoretical perspectives from Institutional Theory, Resource Governance Theory, and motivational frameworks, which emphasise that innovation is embedded within

broader organisational and policy networks. In the Ugandan context, disparities between public and private universities highlight how governance flexibility and institutional culture mediate the impact of incentives on teaching innovation.

Recommendations

Based on the study's findings, several policies, institutional, and practice-oriented recommendations are proposed to strengthen the role of incentives in promoting pedagogical innovation in higher education.

- At the Policy-Level. National higher education authorities like NCHE should support the development of **flexible and innovation-sensitive policy frameworks**, particularly for public universities. Greater autonomy in resource allocation, promotion criteria, and performance appraisal would enable institutions to design incentive systems that respond to local innovation needs rather than rigid bureaucratic requirements.
- At the Institutional-Level, universities should move beyond donor-dependent incentives and institutionalise **coherent incentive frameworks** that integrate financial, professional, and symbolic rewards. Incentives for pedagogical innovation should be explicitly embedded in promotion, appraisal, and workload models to enhance their credibility and motivational value. Transparent criteria for accessing grants, awards, and recognition are essential to building trust and reducing perceptions of arbitrariness.
- Thirdly, academic leaders and departments should emphasise non-financial incentives, such as recognition, professional visibility, leadership opportunities, and academic autonomy, which the study found to be powerful motivators when consistently applied. Encouraging participatory governance and dialogue around innovation goals can further reinforce faculty ownership and intrinsic motivation.

REFERENCES

- Adler, J. (2022). Ensuring rigor in qualitative research: Strategies for trustworthiness. *Qualitative Research in Psychology*, 19(4), 645–661. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14780887.2021.1892604>
- Ahmed, S. (2023). Enhancing qualitative research rigor: Contemporary applications of trustworthiness criteria. *Journal of Mixed Methods Research*, 17(2), 245–258. <https://doi.org/10.1177/15586898221138612>
- Ali, R. (2024). Drivers and barriers for institutional adoption and diffusion of blended learning in higher education. In *Case studies on blended learning in higher education: Policy, planning and quality assurance* (pp. 73–92). Springer Nature.
- Bajaj, R. (2023). *Challenges and opportunities: Faculty development in private higher education institutions (HEIs)*. *Journal of Propulsion Technology*, 44(4), 3072–3080. <https://doi.org/10.52783/tjjpt.v44.i4.1399>
- Banyenzaki, M. (2021). Market-driven reforms and curriculum innovation in private universities in Uganda. *Journal of Higher Education in Africa*, 19(2), 45–62.
- Bhandari, P. (2021). Correlational research: When and how to use it. *Research Methodology Review*, 12(1), 45–59.
- Bukenya, A. (2021). *Recognition as an incentive for educational innovation in Ugandan universities*. *Higher Education Review*, 33(2), 45–58.
- DENG, C. (n.d.). *On establishing incentive mechanism for teachers—A case study of private universities*. <https://doi.org/10.3969/j.issn.1003-6636.2012.03.014>
- Dwivedi, K. (2024). *Pedagogical innovation: Advancing teaching and learning*. ShodhKosh

- Journal of Visual and Performing Arts, 5(3), 75–84. <https://doi.org/10.29121/shodhkosh.v5.i3.2024.3576>
- Førland, O., & Roxå, T. (2023). Establishing reward systems for excellence in teaching—The experience of academics pioneering a reward system. *European Journal of Higher Education*, 19. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21568235.2023.2214713>
- Ge, J., & Pongtornkulpanich, A. (2024). *Motivation, knowledge sharing, and innovative work behaviors of university teachers*. *Journal of System and Management Sciences*, 14(4). <https://doi.org/10.33168/jsms.2024.0406>
- Grace, H., Banson, K., & Saraf, A. (2023). Mixed-methods research. In *Translational radiation oncology* (pp. 531–536). Academic Press. <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-824181-6.00078-2>
- Guàrdia, L., Clougher, D., Anderson, T., & Maina, M. (2021). IDEAS for transforming higher education: An overview of ongoing trends and challenges. *International Review of Research in Open and Distributed Learning*, 22(2), 166–184.
- Hamblin, R. (2024). Conducting semi-structured interviews in social science research. *Qualitative Research Journal*, 24(1), 34–48. <https://doi.org/10.1108/QRJ-07-2023-0091>
- Hao, D. (2023). *Study on incentive factors and incentive effect differences of teachers in universities and colleges under the view of demographic variables*. *BMC Psychology*, 11. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40359-023-01426-6>
- Johnson, M. D., Sawaya, W. J., & Narayanan, A. (n.d.). Rewarding teaching excellence in higher education: An analysis of an incentive program at a Tier I research institute and a prescription for future teaching incentive programs. *International Journal of Public Sector Performance Management*. <https://doi.org/10.1504/ijpspm.2021.10037322>
- Kabanda, H., & Amany, J. (2020). *Faculty motivation and innovation in Ugandan higher education institutions*. *African Journal of Education and Innovation Studies*, 4(2), 24–39.
- Kakar, A. S., Khan, M. U., & Ullah, R. (2023). Strengthening qualitative rigor in educational research. *International Journal of Educational Research Methodology*, 14(3), 211–224.
- Kanyerezi, G. (2021). *The role of government policy in university innovation systems in Uganda*. *Journal of African Public Policy & Administration*, 6(1), 50–65.
- Kasakewitch, J. P., Coelho, H. G. B., & Lima, B. B. (2025). Mixed methods research. In *Translational cardiology* (pp. 469–473). Academic Press. <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-323-90878-8.00092-1>
- Kasozi, A. B. K. (2020). *The state of higher education and training in Uganda*. Fountain Publishers.
- Katsari, K., Bizos, J. N., Gogou, M., & Gogos, C. V. (2025). *Innovation in vocational education and training in Greece: Educators' motivations*. *European Journal of Education Studies*, 12(7).
- Ketsman, O., Droog, A., & Qazi, S. (2025). Mapping the prevalence of mixed methods research in educational technology journals. *Computers & Education*, 226, 105207. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.compedu.2024.105207>
- Kiggundu, M. (2019). *The role of faculty incentives in promoting educational innovation in Uganda*. *Uganda Journal of Education and Development*, 3(1), 27–43.
- Kinzie, J., & Major, C. (2025). Leveraging change: Institutional strategies for teaching

- and learning transformation in higher education. In *Higher education: Handbook of theory and research* (Vol. 41, pp. 1–61). Springer.
- Kottmann, A., Schildkamp, K., & van der Meulen, B. (2024). *Determinants of the innovation behaviour of teachers in higher education*. Innovative Higher Education, 1–22. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10755-023-09689-y>
- Krueger, R. A., & Casey, M. A. (2020). *Focus groups: A practical guide for applied research* (5th ed.). SAGE Publications.
- Lee, Y., Mann, J., & Migotsky, C. (2024). Fostering innovation: Insights from faculty participation in teaching-focused communities of practice. American Society for Engineering Education (ASEE). <https://doi.org/10.18260/1-2--47475>
- Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1985). *Naturalistic inquiry*. SAGE Publications.
- Matei, M., Abrudan, M. M., Săveanu, T. G., & Scîntee, A. A. (2025). Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in academia: A mixed-method exploration of motivational drivers. *Annals of the University of Oradea, Economic Science Series*, 34(1), 112–129.
- Noronha, R. M. (2025). Bridging pedagogical innovation and practice: A literature review on ICT adoption in higher education. *MMIT Proceedings*, 105–111.
- Nsubuga, J. (2020). *Incentives for students and their role in promoting educational innovation: A case study of Uganda Christian University and Muni University*. Higher Education Review, 37(3), 176–189.
- Opondo, J. (2022). Bureaucracy and innovation in Ugandan higher education institutions: A comparative study. *Makerere Journal of Higher Education*, 14(3), 205–222. <https://doi.org/10.4314/majohe.v14i3.10>
- Proença, S. (2025). How to boost entrepreneurship and innovation in higher education institutions. In *European Conference on Innovation and Entrepreneurship* (pp. 575–583). Academic Conferences International.
- Ramli, H., & Yahya, N. A. (2025). Mixed-methods research. In *Introduction to public health and research: Essential concepts* (pp. 59–76). Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1234-5_4
- Risi, D., Vigneau, L., Bohn, S., & Wickert, C. (2022). Institutional theory-based research on corporate social responsibility: Bringing values back in. *International Journal of Management Reviews*, 25(1), 3–23. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ijmr.12299>
- Shabani, T., Masengub, R., & Ruzive, B. (2025). The innovative instructor and the innovative learner in Africa: A review. *The Dyke*, 19(1), 620–646.
- Ssemanda, D. (2021). *Performance-based incentives and educational innovation: Evidence from Uganda Christian University*. Journal of Higher Education Policy and Practice, 4(1), 15–32.
- Tang, G. (2025). Using mixed methods research to study research integrity: Current status, issues, and guidelines. *Accountability in Research*, 32(5), 807–828. <https://doi.org/10.1080/08989621.2024.2321098>
- Wei, H., & Caiga, B. T. (2024). *Teaching innovation practices, career development support, and satisfaction of college teachers in a Chinese university*. Journal of Research in Innovative Education, 12(2), 102–113. <https://doi.org/10.70979/guyu6302>
- Woolford, J., Haegeman, K., Hazelkorn, E., Cavicchi, A., & Kroll, H. (2025). Tertiary education in place-based transformative

innovation. *Higher Education Policy*, Advance online publication.

Yamane, T. (1967). *Statistics: An introductory analysis* (2nd ed.). Harper & Row.

Zhao, F., Ahmed, F., Iqbal, M., Mughal, M. F., Qin, Y. J., Faraz, N. A., & Hunt, V. J. (2020). *Shaping behaviors through institutional support in British higher educational institutions: Focusing on employees for sustainable technological change*. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 11, 584857. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.584857>

Zhao, L., & Wu, S.-C. (2024). *Innovative strategies for teacher engagement: A dual-drive model integrating job resources and self-leadership in private universities*. *The EUrASEANs: Journal on Global Socio-Economic Dynamics*, 1(44), 368–387. [https://doi.org/10.35678/2539-5645.1\(44\).2024.368-387](https://doi.org/10.35678/2539-5645.1(44).2024.368-387)